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DISMISSAL IN CIVIL CASES FOR NONDISCLOSURE OF
SURVEILLANCE RECORDS: POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH
AN EAVESDROPPER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Prior to 1968, the use of electronic surveillance in the private sector
was widespread and extensively documented.' At that time it was
estimated that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping in industrial
espionage tripled every year.' In response to this invasion of privacy
Congress included title III within the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.' Section 2515 of title III grants a civil litigant the
right to exclude evidence obtained from illegal electronic surveillance
conducted by a private party.4 Because of the awareness spawned by
the public debate surrounding wiretapping in the late sixties5 and due
to an increased ability to detect surveillance devices,' civil litigants will
now be more likely to discover whether they have been the victims of
illegal surveillance,' thus presumably leading to wider use of § 2515's
protections.
1. S. Rx. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]; Comment, 19 AD. L. Rxv. 442, 446-47 (1967) (remarks of Senator Edward
Long to the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, Indiana, Apr. 1, 1967) (indi-
cating widespread use of electronic eavesdropping in labor-management and com-
mercial relations). See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1967) ; Westin,
Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUm. L.
REv. 1003, 1008 (1966) ; Wiretapping and Electronic Ecevesdropping in Civil Cases and
Under the Criminal Law, 6 ILL. CONTINUING LEGAL ED. 89, 98 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Wiretapping].
2. Comment, 19 AD. L. Rxv. 442, 444 (1967).
3. Title III of the Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
4. Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a
political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in
violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970). The circumstances under which disclosure is illegal are set
forth in §§ 2511 and 2517. 18 U.S.C. § 2511, 2517 (1970).
5. Wiretapping, supra note 1, at 98.
6. The five years following the passage of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 have doubtless
significantly hindered the growth of the technology of eavesdropping devices. Section
2512(b) has prohibited the manufacture of such devices. However, no such hindrance
has been imposed upon the development of devices for detecting surveillance equipment.
Thus, with the presumed increase in detection equipment sophistication occurring
simultaneously with an effective halt in the general development of listening devices
intended for public consumption, it is not unrealistic to expect that at least some im-
provement in the detection of eavesdropping and wiretapping equipment has been
achieved in the last few years.
7. There are numerous examples of private individuals discovering electronic
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Section 2515 is implemented by a motion to suppress tainted
evidence. Normally, full disclosure of surveillance records prior to a
suppression hearing will be ordered to enable an aggrieved party to pre-
pare adequately for the hearing.' A failure to make such disclosure will at
times require the trial court to dismiss9 an eavesdropper's case in order to
fully protect a party's right to privacy as guaranteed by § 2515.10 How-
ever, the court's power to dismiss is limited by the eavesdropper's con-
stitutional rights. Dismissal without a hearing for some failures to
disclose may be a denial of the eavesdropper's due process rights or im-
pose an impermissible burden on the eavesdropper's assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination. This note will identify situations
where dismissal raises conflicts with the eavesdropper's rights and
attempt to construct an analytical framework for resolving these pro-
blems.
THE PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
Following the commencement of a civil suit between an eavesdropper
and his victim on some matter collateral to the illegal surveillanceu the
aggrieved party may move for suppression of all evidence gained as a
result of illegal surveillance activities. This motion is made on the
ground that the victim's communications were unlawfully intercepted by
his opponent." The aggrieved party must make a prima facie showing
of such illegal surveillance before a suppression hearing will be granted."
surveillance conducted against them by other persons. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d
239 (1964).
8. See text accompanying notes 14-20 infra.
9. It should be noted that sanctions for nondisclosure are not provided in 18 U.S.C.§§ 2510-20 (1970). However, they are available under FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2) (A)-(D). Among the sanctions available are "dismissing the action . . . or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party." FED. R. Cirv. P. 37 (b) (2) (C).
Although dismissal is usually thought of as a sanction against a plaintiff and defaultjudgment as the analogous sanction against a defendant, the term "dismissal" will be
used in this note to encompass such a sanction against either party.
10. See note 25 infra.
11. The scope of this note is limited to civil disputes where, for example, an
eavesdropper sues for breach of contract and he intends to use evidence which was
obtained from electronic surveillance activities. A civil suit against the eavesdropper
for damages arising from his illegal interception of wire or oral communications is
authorized under § 2520 of title III but will not be considered here. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(1970).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10) (a) (i) (1970).
13. When a criminal defendant makes a prima facie showing that the government
has eavesdropped, the burden shifts to the government to show that its evidence against
the defendant was not tainted by unlawful wiretapping. E.g, United States v. Goldstein,
120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941). Similarly, such a showing by the aggrieved party
under § 2518 (10) (a) (i) ought to be sufficient to elicit a court order granting a
suppression hearing.
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The next step is to order disclosure of surveillance records so that
the aggrieved party can prepare for the suppression hearing. Section
2518 (10) (a) (iii) provides that
upon the filing [of a motion to suppress] by the aggrieved
person, [the judge] may in his discretion make available to the
aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection such portions of
the intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as
the judge determines to be in the interests of justice. 4
This broad discretion in ordering disclosure has been severely curtailed
by Alderman v. United States, at least where illegal surveillance by the
government infringes upon a criminal defendant's fourth amendment
rights. In Alderman, the Supreme Court reasoned that if the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule were to effectively protect the defendant's
fourth amendment rights, disclosure of all surveillance records would be re-
quired, regardless of their arguable irrelevance to the case against the
defendant." Thus, the Court made full disclosure prior to the sup-
pression hearing a constitutional minimum for the effective use of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 7
Utilizing the rationale behind the Alderman decision, full disclosure
ought to be required in civil applications of § 2515 as well since § 2515
was intended to protect rights equal in importance to those protected
by the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Congress' purpose in
making § 2515 applicable to civil cases was stated in commentary ac-
companying that provision: "[The suppression of evidence] is not
limited to criminal proceedings. Such a suppression rule is necessary
and proper to protect privacy."'8 Moreover, in earlier legislative com-
mentary applicable to all provisions of title III, "privacy" had been
described as "a right arising under certain provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the due process clause of the 14th amendment."'" Thus,
because of the constitutional importance of the right of privacy protected
by § 2515, congressional intent would be frustrated if pre-suppression
hearing procedures were less than the constitutional minimum provided
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10) (a) (iii) (1970).
15. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
16. Id. at 182.
17. Id. at 184. Compare Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomin. No. 5 of the House
Comm. ot the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 377-80 (1970) (Prepared Statement of
Professor Herman Schwartz) with 116 CONG. REc. 8659-67 (daily ed. June 9, 1970)
(remarks of Senator John McClellan).
18. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 96 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 92.
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in Alderian.2
Assuming that full disclosure has been ordered, the next step is to
determine what sanction should be applied to an eavesdropper who fails
to make such disclosure. In Alderman, the Court held that a failure to
make full disclosure would require dismissal of the case against a criminal
defendant." The implicit premise behind such a severe sanction can be
described in the following syllogism: (1) The government cannot build
its case against the defendant with evidence gained as a result of a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights;22 (2) When the defen-
dant is not armed with the product of full disclosure, the suppression
hearing may not adequately identify all of the evidence which the govern-
20. It is elementary that ineffective procedural safeguards can result in the loss
of substantive rights. Moreover, such safeguards are tailored to the importance of the
right being protected. Where electronic surveillance by the government violates a
criminal defendant's fourth amendment rights, as in Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969), a court must employ constitutional analysis to procedures protecting
that right because of governmental action. But where the infringement of in-
dividual rights involves no governmental involvement, constitutional analysis is inap-
propriate. In such cases a court must look to congressional intent to determine the
degree of procedural protection to be accorded a statutory right such as § 2515. Con-
gress may, of course, require protection of a privately infringed right at a level less
than, equal to or even exceeding constitutional minima protecting similar rights from
governmental infringement. Cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) reaches purely private conspiracies to deprive persons
of consitutional rights). Thus, the question becomes whether Congress intended pro-
cedures for the protection of § 2515 rights to be equal to, the constitutional minimum
used in protecting the effectiveness of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
Although Congress felt it was providing adequate protection for privacy rights
guaranteed by § 2515 in leaving disclosure of surveillance records to the discretion of
the trial court judge, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (10(a) (iii) (1970), at the time title III was
passed, the Alderman decision had not been available for congressional consideration.
It is plain from a reading of congressional commentary accompanying § 2518 (10) (a) (iii)
that Congress did not comprehend the significance of the relationship between the
pre-suppression hearing disclosure issue and the vitality of § 2515. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 106. The sheer force of the rationale of the full disclosure rule in
Alderman cogently reveals Congress' failure to consider the impact of disclosure on §
2515 rights. That rationale may be paraphrased as follows:
[Ihf the [suppression] hearings [effectuating § 2515 rights] are to be more
than a formality and [the aggrieved party] not left entirely to reliance on [the
eavesdropper's] testimony, there should be turned over to [him] the records
of those overheard conversations which the [eavesdropper] was not entitled to
use in building [his] case against [the aggrieved party].
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). Furthermore, it is clear that
Congress felt that the privacy right protected by § 2515 was at least as important as
that protected by the fourth amendment exclusionary rule although the former does
not depend upon governmental infringement for its application. See notes 18 & 19 supra
& text accompanying. Therefore, if § 2515 is to protect the aggrieved party's privacy
in a manner consistent with its constitutional importance, in spite of the uninformed
congressional grant of discretion to the trial judge, the constitutional minimum for full
disclosure promulgated by the Alderman Court ought to govern the administration of
§ 2515.
21. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969).
22. Id. at 171.
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ment is prohibited from using;23 (3) Therefore, since absent full dis-
closure, there is a risk that tainted evidence may be used to convict the
defendant, his fourth amendment right not to be subject to a tainted
conviction requires dismissal. 4 This syllogism is equally applicable to
the private surveillance situation in light of the manifest congressional
intent concerning § 2515."2 Accordingly, dismissal ought to be the
sanction applicable to a private eavesdropper who fails to fulfill his
duty to make disclosure of surveillance records prior to the suppression
hearing. This is at least true where, as in Alderman, the eavesdropper
deliberately refuses to disclose surveillance records currently in his
possession.2" But dismissal of an eavesdropper who is unable to produce
surveillance records may raise serious questions of a denial of due process.
Moreover, the eavesdropper may refuse to disclose surveillance records
based on his privilege against self-incrimination, an option not available
to the government in a criminal case. It is these types of failures to
disclose with which this note will be concerned.
DUE PROCESS AND DISMISSAL FOR NONDISCLOSURE
In civil trials, the sanction of dismissal for incomplete disclosure
of surveillance records could raise a due process issue. The deprivation
of a defendant's property or a plaintiff's cause of action without a hearing
on the merits may violate due process rights.27 Of course, no due process
23. Id. at 183.
24. Id. at 184.
25. The syllogism can be employed as follows where the aggrieved party's privacy
has been infringed by private electronic surveillance: (1) The eavesdropper cannot
build his case against the aggrieved party with evidence gained as a result of a violation
of that party's right of privacy, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970) ; (2) When the aggrieved
party is not armed with the product of full disclosure, the suppression hearing may not
adequately identify all of the evidence which the eavesdropper is prohibited from using;
(3) Therefore, since absent full disclosure there is a risk that tainted evidence may be
used to win the case against the aggrieved party, the importance of his privacy right
under § 2515 not to be subject to a loss of substantive rights under the auspices of a
tainted judicial proceeding requires dismissal. See note 18 stpra & text accompanying.
26. As of this date the Supreme Court has not had to apply the principles in
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), to a situation where surveillance
records bearing on the case against the defendant could not be produced because of their
loss or destruction. But at least two lower federal courts have indicated that dismissal
will not be imposed for a failure to produce wholly irrelevant records. See United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Sellers, 315 F.
Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (interpreting Alderman).
27. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958); Developments
in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 989 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]. Plaintiffs as well as defendants stand to lose a valuable property right if
they are dismissed. See Link v. Wabash R. R., 370 U.S. 626, 646 (1962) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ; accord, Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S.
544 (1926) ; Barbato v. Tuosto, 38 Misc. 2d 823, 824, 238 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (1963)
(dictum). In Barbato, the court lucidly explained why plaintiffs shoula !not be treated
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issue is presented by dimissing a civil litigant whose incomplete dis-
closure is willful and deliberate." A court may reasonably infer that a
civil litigant who deliberately refuses to, disclose surveillance records
does so because the records would show that the evidence he needs to
win his case is inadmissible.29 Since it is inferred that he would lose
at trial, the eavesdropper cannot object that dismissal for nondisclosure
deprives him of any substantive rights.
However, even when the failure to disclose is not willful and deli-
berate, dismissal may be required. Regardless of the eavesdropper's
good faith efforts to produce surveillance records which may have been
lost or destroyed, the court should presume that unproduced tapes will
reveal the taint of the eavesdropper's evidence. This presumption is
justified for three reasons. First, it remains possible that the undisclosed
surveillance records would aid the victim in discovering that part of the
eavesdropper's evidence which was illegally obtained." If a court over-
differently than defendants in determining whether dismissal should be granted.
Compelling one to forego a cause of action does not, to me, differ essentially
from compelling one to relinquish a defense. In either event, one may be effec-
tively deprived of his property. The right of a defendant to resist an unfounded
claim is no greater than that of a plaintiff to prosecute a meritorious one.
No lesser wrong results from preventing plaintiff from recovering that which
in law is his than permitting a defendant to retain that which rightfully
belongs to plaintiff.
Id.
28. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
29. Cf. id. The Court said that dismissal was justified in the case of willful
failure to disclose information on the ground that an inference could be drawn from
such willful failure that the untruth or bad faith of the failing party's allegations
would be shown by the undisclosed information. Id. at 350-51. The Court's decision
has been interpreted to mean that when an inference can be drawn that information
not produced would be so damaging that the failing party would lose on the merits,
then dismissal is appropriate. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery,
58 COLUm. L. REv. 480, 483 n. 6 (1958). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 93 S. Ct. 647
(1973).
30. Even though an inference regarding the damaging effect of undisclosed in-
formation cannot be drawn when the failing party makes a good faith effort to
produce, Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210 (1958), it is still possible
for the withheld information to be sufficiently damaging to justify dismissal. Inde-
pendent Products Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 27 F.R.D. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (dictum);
Note, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 836, 842 (1958); cf. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co. v.
Strauss & Co., 38 F. Supp. 229, 230 (D. Ore. 1940). This possibility was recognized
by the Supreme Court in Societe Internationale v. Rogers, supra at 208. But cf. 4A
J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE 11 37.05, at 37-91 (2d ed. 1972);
C. WRIGHT, HANDBoOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 90, at 396-97 (2d ed. 1970) ;
Brown, Proposed Changes to Rule 33 Interrogatories and Rule 37 Sanctions, 11 ARiz.
L. REv. 443, 452 (1969); Developments, supra note 27, at 990; Note, Recent Innova-
tions to Pretrial Discovery Sanctions: Rule 37 Reinterpreted, 1959 DuKE L.J. 278,
290. See also Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir.
1970); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 376 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir. 1967); Gill v.
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looks this possibility, it risks admitting tainted evidence at trial because
the victim may have been unable to identify such evidence at a suppres-
sion hearing.3 Proceeding to trial when such a risk exists would inade-
quately protect the victim's privacy interests as contemplated by §
2515."2 Second, the eavesdropper's duty to disclose tapes is a duty to
preserve them prior to requested disclosure. 3 This duty imposes a
heavy burden on the eavesdropper to show an absence of negligence in
procedures used to preserve such tapes. 4 Moreover, in light of their
importance in the disposition of the case, a negligent failure to preserve
the tapes would justify the sanction of dismissal. 5 And third, the eaves-
dropper has the burden of showing that his evidence is not tainted.3"
In deference to the eavesdropper's due process rights, however, he
must be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption. Thus, when the
eavesdropper can show (1) that he had no arguable control over loss or
destruction of missing records and (2) that missing tapes are not relevant
to the case, then dismissal is both unnecessary and inappropriate.
Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957); Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705,
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
31. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969).
32. A court ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to produce information not
obtained through illegal surveillance may deny the motion where the failure is non-
willful because the trial judge can use methods other than dismissal to avoid prejudice
to the party seeking discovery. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212-13
(1958). However, where there is illegal surveillance, proceeding to trial without full
disclosure simply because the failure to disclose was not willful would constitute a
'serious abridgement of the privacy interests protected by § 2515. See notes 22-25 supra
& text accompanying. Because of the importance of such interests, this abridgement
should not be tolerated. See note 20 supra. Thus, where there is illegal surveillance,
the court must examine circumstances beyond the reasons for the eavesdropper's failure
to disclose in order to carry out the mandate of § 2515.
33. Cf. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
34. Id. at 652.
35. Among the factors to be considered when selecting the sanction to be imposed
for a negligent failure to preserve discoverable information are (1) the degree of
negligence involved and (2) the importance of the material lost. United States v.
Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Because a single tape may yield tainted
evidentiary fruit extending to the entire case against the aggrieved party, the loss of
such a tape deprives the aggrieved party of evidence which can effectively dispose of
the case against him in the suppression hearing. Thus, a negligent failure to preserve
any of the surveillance records warrants dismissal in light of its critical importance.
Cf. Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), which may be
suggesting that mental states such as gross negligence can support a dismissal though
it is less amenable to an inference of the type employed in Hammond Packing Co. v.
Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909), than a willful failure to comply with a production
order. Campbell v. Johnson, supra at 707. See also Dorsey v. Academy Moving &
Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969) ; United States
v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d
485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941).
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Arguable Control
Initially, the trial court ought to consider the eavesdropper's arguable
control over the loss or destruction of unproduced surveillance records.
Where the eavesdropper is unable to disclose because the surveillance
records have been lost or destroyed, the court should consider whether
the eavesdropper could have prevented their loss. Where an eaves-
dropper had control of surveillance records which have been destroyed,
such loss should be treated as presumptively negligent because of the
eavesdropper's duty to preserve the surveillance records.37 Under such
circumstances, the eavesdropper must meet a heavy burden to show that
his actions were not the cause of the loss or destruction of missing
tapes.3" Upon determining that the eavesdropper's negligence caused
the loss or destruction, the court may infer from the failure to preserve
the tapes that their loss was occasioned by the eavesdropper's desire to
prevent the court from discovering the inadmissibility of his evidence. 9
Thus, the court's inquiry is ended and dismissal ought to be imposed.' °
But if the eavesdropper can demonstrate that he exercised due care over
the records and their loss was fortuitous, or if he can show that he had
no control over them-as, for example, where they are lost while in
police custody-the court may then make further inquiry to determine
their relevance to the case.
Irrelevance
Irrelevance may be shown in either of two ways. First, if the court
determines that none of the tapes produced are relevant and that such
tapes are representative of the total, then the court may infer that those
tapes which cannot be produced are similarly irrelevant. If surveillance
records already produced bear no relevance to the controversy before the
court, those which cannot be produced are very likely to be irrelevant as
well. Dismissal for nonproduction under such circumstances would be
inappropriate."' However, before inferring irrelevance the court should
alsq determine whether the tapes produced are representative of the
37. The eavesdropper has a duty to fully disclose surveillance records. See note 20
supra & text accompanying. Thus, it is his duty to preserve such records prior to a
request for disclosure. Cf. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38. Cf. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
39. Although this possibility always exists when damaging information is sought,
it is greater when the information is sought from an eavesdroper who has already
shown his propensity to violate the law. A prerequisite to the production of surveil-
lance records is that the victim make a prima facie showing that eavesdropping has
occurred. United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941).
40. See note 35 supra.
41. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637 (2d Cir. 1950); United States
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total. In making this determination, the court should consider the
proportion of tmproduced tapes to those which have been disclosed.
The larger the percentage of produced tapes, the more likely they are to
be representative of those which have not been disclosed.42 But if any of
the produced tapes are relevant to the case, the irrelevance of the missing
tapes cannot be inferred. Since it would then be possible to predict that
some portion of the missing tapes might be relevant, proceeding with a
hearing on the merits under such circumstances may create an unreason-
able risk that the court will admit tainted material into evidence. Rather
than accept this risk, the court should dismiss the case against the victim
even though the incomplete disclosure is not the fault of the eaves-
dropper.2
Second, the eavesdropper, through reliable testimony or otherwise,
may be able to produce evidence concerning tape contents which indicates
that they are not relevant to the case before the court. While information
provided to supplant missing tape contents will be relatively worthless
to the victim in light of the need for absolute accuracy,14 information
provided to characterize tape contents can acceptably and reliably prove
the irrelevance of a missing tape.45  For example, testimony affirming
the date on which eavesdropping took place might reveal the impossibility
that a missing tape is related to the substance of the case. 6
In sum, when the eavesdropper can overcome the presumption of
taint by showing, in the prescribed manner, that there is no significant
risk that tainted evidence will be admitted, the court should proceed
to a trial on the merits in deference to the eavesdrqpper's due process
rights. But when such a risk exists, the court should dismiss the eaves-
v. Sellers, 315 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1970); cf. United States v. Giordano,
440 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1971).
42. See, e.g., H. ALDER & E. ROESSLER, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND
STATISTICS 136 (4th ed. 1968).
43. See note 32 supra & text accompanying.
44. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court indicated that
it is the victim's personal knowledge and interpretation of information found only in
the illegally obtained tapes which enables him to protect his privacy. The importance of
the authenticity and completeness of such information was described as follows:
An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears
to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller or the individual on
the other end of the telephone, or even the manner of speaking or using
words may have special significance to one who knows the more intimate
facts of the accused's life.
Id. at 182. This kind of information is missing from substitutions for tape contents.
45. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637 (2d Cir. 1950); United States
v. Sellers, 315 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1970); cf. United States v. Giordano,
440 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1971).
46. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v.
Sellers, 315 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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dropper in order to protect a victim's privacy rights guaranteed by §
2515.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
When disclosure of surveillance records is ordered, the eavesdropper
is likely to withhold the records under an assertion of his privilege against
self-incrimination since disclosure amounts to an admission of unlawful
activity.4 7 He may argue that the sanction of dismissal for incomplete
disclosure imposes an impermissible burden on the exercise of his con-
stitutional privilege. Superficial support for this argument can be found
in cases holding that public employees may not be discharged merely
because they invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. In the
final analysis, however, a constitutionally impermissible cost on the
eavesdropper's privilege is not imposed when he is faced with the choice
of disclosure or dismissal.
The eavesdropper's argument is based on the analysis of some com-
mentators who have read cases concerning dismissals of public employees
as prohibiting state and federal courts from striking a civil litigant's
pleadings because of his assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination." In Malloy v. Hogan,49 the Supreme Court stated that
"no penalty" could be imposed on a party exercising his right to remain
silent."0 In Spevack v. Klein," the Court, in dictum, explained "penalty"
to mean anything which makes the assertion of the privilege "costly."52
Despite the Court's broad language, however, this case was decided on
47. I would have no knowledge of [motions to suppress in a civil case]
since it would be illegal in the state of New York [to engage in private
wiretapping], and no one would admit to use of such equipment in a civil
case because it would immediately subject them to criminal prosecution.
Wiretapping, supra note 1, at 136.
Disclosure of surveillance records would indicate that the person making dis-
closure had engaged in illegal electronic surveillance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(1) (a). In addition, disclosure would prove useful in showing possession of eaves-
dropping equipment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1) (b).
48. Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Dis-
covery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U. SAN
F ANclsco L. REv. 12, 26 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Donnici]; Commentary, Penaliz-
ing the Civil Litigant Who Invokes the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U.
FLA. L. Rav. 541, 550 (1972); Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75, 82 [hereinafter cited as Comment]; Note,
Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrinination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REv.
322, 339 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note]; 1970 WAsir. U.L.Q.. 371, 376.
49. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
50. Id. at 8.
51. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
52. Id. at 515. The Court said that the concept of "costly" extended beyond fines
or imprisonment, but it did not say whether loss of property without a hearing was
an impermissible cost. Id.
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the narrower ground that deprivation of livelihood could not be
the price for exercising the right against self-incrimination." In Gardner
v. Broderick," the Court repudiated the broad language of Spevack
while reaffirming the narrow principle that deprivation of livelihood is
a cost which cannot be imposed on the exercise of the privilege. 5
In addition to the Court's unwillingness to expand the concept of
impermissible cost following Gardner, a careful reading of earlier em-
ployment discharge cases indicates that the Court is willing to impose
some costs on an assertion of the privilege in civil cases. These earlier
cases show that discharge will be allowed when job unsuitability can
be presumed from the employee's silence. As Professor Orfield observed
of those cases:
While the Supreme Court has insisted that no inference of
guilt may be made as to one who invokes the privilege against
self-incrimination, it has been willing to permit the imposition
of severe economic penalties upon those who invoke the privilege.
Its rationale is that it is not because of the claim of privilege,
but because the refusal to answer questions deemed appropriate
may be regarded as evidence of incompetence, of lack of candor
where there is a duty to disclose, or of unwillingness to supply
information relevant to a judgment of fitness."
Thus, when an employee's refusal to testify could support a statutory
presumption of job unsuitability, the Court has permitted the discharge
regardless of the privilege against self-incrimination."
These earlier cases may be reconciled with those of the later Spevack-
Gardner line of cases in such a way that the eavesdropper's situation
can be shown to be more properly analyzed in light of the earlier cases.
In the later cases, the employee was discharged upon claiming his pri-
vilege with no determination that he was otherwise unsuitable for em-
53. 385 U.S. at 514.
54. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
55. Id. at 278. An identical result was reached in the companion case of Uni-
formed Sanitation Men's Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
56. Orfield, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimtination i Federal Cases, 25 U.
PiTt. L. REV. 503, 540 (1964).
57. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 6 (1960); Lerner
v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1958). Commentators have read Lerner and Nelson
as cases where the Supreme Court upheld the validity of statutes which created a
conclusive presuption of job unsuitability for a refusal to answer questions regarding
an employee's fitness for continued employment. See note 56 supra & text accompany-
ing. But see Donnici, supra note 48, at 27.
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ployment5 Thus, in those cases it was clear that the employee had been
deprived of a job which he was still entitled to hold except for his claim
of the privilege. But in the earlier cases it was statutorily presumed
from the employee's silence that he was no longer a suitable employee."9
Thus, by statutory definition he had not lost a job which was rightfully
his. Hence, no cost or at least no constitutionally unacceptable cost was
imposed on his exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. It
therefore follows that when dismissal of an eavesdropper's case is based
on the presumption that his evidence is tainted,"0 rather than his assertion
of the privilege against self-incrimination, dismissal does not impose an
impermissible cost upon the eavesdropper's privilege. Indeed, a logical
corollary of the presumption of taint is that a suppression hearing where
the victim is armed with the product of full disclosure would reveal that
the eavesdropper has insufficient independently obtained evidence to win
his case on the merits. Consequently, dismissal for failure to disclose
based on such a presumption deprives the eavesdropper of no legally
provable cause of action or defense to liability, and therefore, no cost is
imposed on the exercise of the privilege.
Even if, for various reasons, the court does not wish to use a pre-
sumption of taint in situations where the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is asserted by the eavesdropper, it has been suggested by some com-
mentators that in civil cases the full protection of the privilege does
not require a refusal to draw an inference unfavorable to the party
asserting the privilege where that party has the burden of proof on the
issue in question." It should be noted that in any civil proceeding
58. Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal to account for their
conduct as employees of the city. They were dismissed for invoking and re-
fusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Uniformed Sanitation Men's Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283 (1968).
Other examples of such language are abundant. E.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 278 (1968).
59. Typical of these cases is Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1
(1960). The Court described the operation of the statute as follows:
[The California statute] require[s] the employee to answer any interrogation
in the field outlined. Failure to answer "on any ground whatsoever any such
questions" renders the employee "guilty of insubordination" and requires that
he "be suspended and dismissed from his employment in the manner provided
by law."
Id. at 6.
60. Such a presumption could be justified on the first and third of the three
grounds available for the same presumption utilized when the eavesdropper is unable to
produce lost or destroyed surveillance records. See notes 30-32 & 36 supra & text ac-
companying.
61. E.g., Note, supra note 48, at 340.
There is a very great difference between a presumption of taint, like that justified
in the text accompanying notes 30-36 supra, and an inference of taint, suggested here.
See BLACK'S LAw DicnoNARY 917-18 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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such as a suppression hearing in which a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is asserted, the issue of criminal guilt is collateral to the ultimate
issue in question. Thus, in a civil trial inferences drawn from silence
based on a privilege against self-incrimination can go either to the issue
of liability or to the claimant's guilt. The former is permissible62 while
the latter is unconstitutional. 3 Consequently, if the burden of proof on
the ultimate question in a suppression hearing-whether the eaves-
dropper's evidence is of independent origin-rests with the eavesdropper,
his refusal to disclose would permit the court to dismiss him based on a
permissible inference that all of his evidence is tainted.
In criminal cases where the defendant is the victim of illegal
government surveillance, the burden of proof on the issue of the pro-
priety of the evidence to be used at trial is on the government.6 ' Both
of the grounds which justify imposing such a burden on the government
are applicable to parties in civil disputes who engage in electronic sur-
veillance activities. First, the eavesdropping party has been shown to
be a wrongdoer vis-A-vis his opponent. Second, he has exclusive pos-
session of information showing what evidence he has independently
acquired, if any. 5 Accordingly, the nongovernmental eavesdropper can
fairly be required to prove the independent origin of the evidence he
intends to use at trial. Therefore, adverse inference on the issue of the
admissibility of the eavesdropper's evidence might be appropriate upon a
refusal to disclose, and dismissal could justifiably be ordered.6
62. E.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953). See generally
8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENC E IN TiA.s AT CoimoN LAW § 2272, at 439 & n.14 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961).
63. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See also Ratner, Consequences
of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrinination, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 472, 473
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Ratner].
64. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969); United States
v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485,
488 (2d Cir. 1941).
65. [Ilt appears to us that this should be the rule in analogy to the well-
settled doctrine in civil cases that a wrongdoer who has mingled the conse-
quences of lawful and unlawful conduct, has the burden of disentangling them
and must bear the prejudice of his failure to do so .... To impose the duty
upon the prosecution is particularly appropriate here, for it necessarily has
full knowledge of just how its case has been prepared ...
United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941).
66. Commentators advocating the use of adverse inference often do so by analogy
to an inference permitted to be made by a jury upon a party's failure to testify at
trial. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 48, at 79. But there is no reason why the in-
fererence should not be available to the trial judge when there is a failure to produce
information in pretrial. However, to say that an inference is available does not imply
that it ought to be employed. Drawing an inference that an eavesdropper's evidence is
tainted from the fact that he has refused to disclose surveillance records based on his
privilege against self-incrimination is a risky proposition. Inference, after all, is
[a] process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established
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Finally, not only is dismissal for nondisclosure compatible with an
eavesdropper's privilege against self-incrimination, but allowing the
privilege to block disclosure would totally emasculate § 2515's pro-
tection of a victim's privacy rights.67 Permitting the privilege to com-
pletely bar disclosure of surveillance records to the victim would pre-
clude his effective participation in the adversary suppression proceedings
which are essential to identify tainted evidence. 8 It therefore seems
unlikely that a dubious assertion of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion would be allowed to thwart § 2515 and thus override the privacy
rights of a victim.
SUMMARY
To fully protect the right of privacy in wire and oral communica-
tions guaranteed by § 2515, it will sometimes be necessary for the trial
judge to dismiss an eavesdropper who fails to disclose surveillance
records to his victim. Such dismissal, while not an undue burden on the
eavesdropper's privilege against self-incrimination, may raise. questions
concerning the eavesdropper's due process rights. Although dismissal
for a willful and deliberate failure to disclose poses no due process pro-
blems, when the failure is not purposeful the trial judges should examine
the circumstances of the failure to determine whether the eavesdropper
could have prevented loss or destruction of surveillance records. When
the failure to disclose is not the fault of the eavesdropper, the court should
employ a presumption that his evidence is tainted. The eavesdropper
may overcome this presumption only by a showing that there is no,
significant risk that undisclosed surveillance records are relevant to the
dispute before the court.
With the passage of § 2515, Congress has taken a major step
toward protecting the privacy rights of civil litigants. Courts must now
implement the requirements of the statute in a manner that will pro-
perly balance the rights of an eavesdropper and his victim.
MARK J. ROGERS
is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already
proved or admitted.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 917 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Whether an inference of taint
ought to be drawn from the eavesdropper's refusal to disclose depends upon the cir-
cumstances of the claim of the privilege. Cf. Ratner, supra note 63, at 491-93.
67. See notes 20 & 25 supra.
63. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969); cf. United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1950). With regard to the consequences flowing
from a failure to disclose surveillance records to the victim, Judge Hand, speaking for
the Second Circuit, stated:
Unless therefore there is some excuse which will toll . . . [the sixth amend-
ment privilege to confront adverse witnesses,] it appears irrefragably demon-
strable that the suppressed records were incompetent.
Id. at 638.
